I Introduction
I conclude that if private actors have goals and values that diverge from those of their public actor counterparts, or from the instruments establishing the relevant state coercive powers, moral hazard becomes much more likely. In such cases, greater transparency is required in order to prevent accountability mechanisms being undermined. A private actor who is ineffective in a morally culpable manner will also likely lose legitimacy, albeit that erosion of legitimacy is possible for all ineffective actors. Most importantly, in the face of divergent goals and values, highly diligent implementation of interim or ongoing accountability mechanisms is vital in order to sustain the legitimate devolution of power to private actors.
RNZSPCA is the main prosecutor of offences relating to companion animals and small-scale farm livestock under the Act.
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The report noted that the fight clubs had been in existence before Serco took over management from Corrections, however the problem worsened greatly after Serco began running the prison. 55 The report cited understaffing, a failure to implement anti-violence strategies, and push back against Corrections monitors as contributing to the fight club problem under Serco's management. 56 This echoed media concerns, with several journalists questioning in particular why Serco guards ate a meal and attended to paperwork while inmate Benjamin Lightbody lay in his cell with brain injuries. 57 Serco was clearly failing to meet basic prisoner safety requirements, an abuse of the state coercive power granted to it to operate a prison facility and manage prisoners. Consideration of its accountability mechanisms compared to those of the other actors discussed can therefore shed light on potential accountability failings in the devolution of state coercive power to private actors.
IV Accountability
Accountability can be difficult to define, being an umbrella term covering various concepts ranging from responsiveness, to control, to liability. 58 However public administration scholar Mark Bovens has compellingly articulated accountability as: 59 a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.
According to Bovens, accountability obligations might be formal, informal or self-imposed.
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They might be mere transparency requirements, in which case they are not true accountability mechanisms because there is no need to answer to any specific forum, and there might not be consequences imposed. 61 They might be mere reporting or justification requirements, which again do not create true accountability because of the potential lack of consequences. 62 They might conversely be legal and direct mechanisms, for example an actor will be held responsible for any criminal offence they commit -a strong accountability mechanism. Alternatively, they might be political, for example a Minister might face questions in Parliament about actions of departments under their control. Actors might also be accountable socially through the media, or professionally to professional standards bodies. 63 There are several different types of accountability pathways therefore, of different strengths and weaknesses, and Bovens provides useful tools with which to analyse them.
In addition to Bovens' analysis, there are some practical and temporal aspects to accountability.
These aspects relate to how accountability mechanisms are initially triggered, and whether they are interim (ongoing) mechanisms or conversely "end-stage" or terminal mechanisms by which an actor may be divested of their role. For instance, if the threshold for a trigger is too high, this may make cause even a strong, formal accountability mechanism to be rarely used in practice. Differentiating between ongoing and end-stage mechanisms is also important. Endstage mechanisms will usually require some transgression to have occurred and will aim to penalise an actor (though they may also have a deterrent effect), whereas ongoing mechanisms can occur regularly with a purpose of early detection or prevention of transgressions.
Consideration of these practical aspects is another tool that can help determine where an accountability failure has occurred, or might occur in future.
The benefit of assessing accountability for our four actors links back to their legitimacy in wielding their powers. Accountability supports legitimacy, particularly in the use of state coercive powers, as accountability encourages the public's consent to the use of those powers by making actors responsible and answerable for their behaviour. This legitimacy is required regardless of whether the actor is public or private, if they are to retain their powers.
Analysis reveals that both public and private actors share strong, formal, legal accountability pathways that support their legitimate use of state coercive power. However, analysis of Serco's failings reveals that some accountability mechanisms were not properly implemented.
I therefore argue that the best way to prevent misuse of coercive power is to have ongoing, interim accountability mechanisms in place, and for those mechanisms to be properly implemented. I also argue that Serco in particular needed these interim mechanisms, because it did not share the same values and goals as Corrections or the Corrections Act. To understand 63 At 451-453. this argument, it is necessary to understand the different types of accountability pathways, their practical aspects, and their strengths and weaknesses. They are detailed below.
A The Employment Relationship
MPI, Corrections and Serco staff are individually accountable in a direct, hierarchical fashion to their managers, in a chain of employment relations stretching from staff on the ground to the Minister. 64 In Bovens' parlance this is vertical accountability -the forum has formal and direct authority over the actor. 65 Consequences for employees' wayward exercise of their coercive powers might range from comments in employee performance appraisals to termination of employment. Assuming that regular employee appraisal occurs (as is the norm in large organisations in New Zealand) this could in theory be considered a strong accountability pathway because it is vertical and direct, and the costs of implementation are low. Moreover, the triggers for this mechanism are in-built into the employment relationship, so they do not require misuse of the coercive powers to have occurred before the mechanism kicks in.
Additionally, it is an interim, ongoing mechanism, iterated at least annually. The trigger for this mechanism will vary from case to case in practice, because it relies on information coming to light that would cause questions to be asked of Ministers. This also makes it a sporadic, unpredictable mechanism, and one that might tend towards being ex post, relying heavily on some transgression to have occurred before it is triggered. Moreover, it is a political mechanism, so while Ministers might be encouraged or even pressured to be accountable, they might not face any practical consequences. Overall therefore, while this mechanism has the potential to be strong once triggered, it cannot be relied upon to hold actors accountable to a sufficient extent to ensure either that past transgressions will result in consequences, or that future abuse of state coercive power will be prevented. Its adequacy to maintain legitimacy in the use of public or private actors' use of state coercive power is therefore weak. This is a formal, legal accountability mechanism that has the potential to be considered strong, especially in the context of New Zealand's robust legal system. It is a retrospective mechanism, requiring a transgression to have occurred before it is triggered, but being legally accountable can be a powerful encouragement not to transgress. The existence of this mechanism can thus shape future behaviour. Consequences are unpredictable and variable however, depending on the degree of the transgression and the willingness of those affected to enforce their rights.
Regarding misuse of state coercive power, such willingness might be high, but so might implementation costs, particularly of bringing a tort claim to court. This mechanism can therefore be deemed robust once triggered but variable in its likelihood of being triggered, thus it can be held only weakly supportive of legitimacy in the use of state coercive power overall.
D Criminal Liability
Individuals are of course legally accountable for any crimes they commit in venturing beyond the scope of their state coercive powers. This is a highly formal accountability mechanism. An example would be if an RNZSPCA inspector were to assault an owner instead of using force only "if necessary" to remove an animal. 77 Implementation costs of this mechanism are low for the complainant, as once a complaint is made to the police, police will lay charges if appropriate. There may theoretically be implementation barriers, particularly relating to prisons where prisoners might fear backlash by staff if they complain. There is no evidence that this is 76 Animal Welfare Act, s 128. 77 Section 127(5).
typically a problem in New Zealand however, and victim fear of reprisal is theoretically possible for almost any crime. This formal, legal mechanism can be considered stronger than the principal-agent pathway therefore. It is still retrospective, however the criminal law is a powerful incentive for actors not to transgress. This can be deemed a highly robust mechanism therefore, that can sustain the legitimacy of the use of state coercive power by public and private actors alike.
E Judicial Review
Public decision-makers are legally accountable through the common law mechanism of judicial review. 78 This creates a further accountability pathway. Corrections and MPI as public actors are subject to judicial review if a complainant can show that a decision should be reviewed, that is, if the decision is essentially public in nature or has significant public ramifications.
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Thus a decision by MPI to seize all of a farm's livestock, for example, is potentially reviewable.
Consequences for the decision-maker include for instance being tasked with re-making the decision in a proper manner. This is an important constitutional mechanism that supports the rule of law, ensuring that the government acts according to the law.
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Implementation costs of this mechanism are very high, creating a significant hurdle to accessing this pathway. Complainants must pay expensive court costs and lawyers' fees, and the process of taking a decision to court for review is extremely slow. It is also somewhat narrow in scope, being available only to assess the decision-making process, not the substance of the decision itself. Once triggered it is ex post in nature, looking back at some transgression. This is not fatal however, because as Bittner pointed out in relation to use of force in policing, an underlying threat can be sufficient to coerce. The fact that judicial review is possible can therefore be enough to nudge public decision-makers to make future decisions in the proper manner -rationally, legally and according to the tenets of natural justice.
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A private actor might also be subject to judicial review, if the interests of justice necessitate that requirements of fairness be imposed on it, for instance if "the organisation is publicly 78 communicate with, or if the ability of the forum to impose consequences is missing. 95 In the example above, Guy was not exposed to consequences after questioning (albeit partly because he had already decided to increase staffing numbers).
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Another problem with this mechanism, apart from a lack of clear consequences, is uncertainty in triggering it. There are two pathways to trigger this mechanism. One relies upon interest groups, stakeholders or the wider public accessing information that the actor itself publishes.
It is relatively easy to forecast what information might lead to adverse consequences if published, for example if the RNZSPCA announced it would spend all donations on prosecutions instead of providing shelter for homeless animals, donations would likely drop.
Such triggers are simply unlikely to occur unless the actor decides itself, or is forced, to publish, for example through Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) requests of public entities. The other pathway relies upon leaks of information to the media, and then upon the media to disseminate the information to the public. This likely requires the issue to be of high public interest.
Neither trigger leads to any guarantee of consequence. There may be social or political ramifications, of course, for instance an actor might have to amend its practices. This was certainly the case when the media highlighted ill-treatment of bobby calves on farms in late 2015, which led to MPI initiating new regulatory measures to mitigate calves' suffering.
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Ramifications may even involve end-stage consequences. In fact, this was exactly the mechanism that brought the Mt Eden prison fight clubs into the public eye, led to questions being raised in Parliament, and led to the Chief Inspector's report and Serco's subsequent loss of contract.
Like many of the accountability mechanisms discussed already therefore, this social accountability can be strong once triggered. However, it is not easy to trigger. In Serco's case, it required footage to be filmed on contraband cellphones, uploaded to YouTube, and the mainstream media to become aware of the footage. Using Bovens' parlance this is a weak accountability mechanism therefore, lacking formality and a clear way for consequences to be imposed upon the actor. It relies on issues being important enough for the public to care about, 95 
M Overall Assessment of Accountability: The Importance of Interim Accountability Measures in the Absence of Shared Values
From the above analysis, there are a range of accountability mechanisms for both public and private actors wielding state coercive power. They range from strong, formal, legal accountability, to political accountability, to informal social accountability. They include measures germane mainly to public actors, such as the avenue of judicial review and the ability to make an official information request, and tools applicable to private actors, such as the RNZSCPA's approved organisation status and Serco's contract.
MPI accountability is certainly not perfect, as the weak accountability surrounding its wide prosecutorial discretion has significant ramifications for its effective enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act (as will be discussed in more detail below). Nor is Corrections accountability perfect -for example, one of the purposes of the Corrections Act is the rehabilitation of prisoners, yet recidivism rates remain stubbornly high at 52%. 131 However, both government actors remain substantially accountable for any misuse of their coercive powers, most strongly through the criminal law and via employment relationship mechanisms such as annual performance reviews, provided that these are properly implemented. Private actors' strongest accountability mechanisms also include the criminal law and, in Serco's case, the employment relationship also, but can extend beyond these. For example Serco's strongest mechanism lay in its contract, while the RNZSPCA is strongly accountable through its status as an approved organisation under the Animal Welfare Act.
Serco and the RNZSPCA are required to be more transparent with Corrections and MPI respectively as their principals, than with the general public. The RNZSPCA as an approved organisation may be audited for compliance with various standards and its MOU with MPI. 146 This is a strong transparency mechanism as it requires the RNZSPCA to provide specific information directly to MPI. Serco is obliged by statute to allow Corrections to monitors prisons it manages, another transparency device.
147 This also appears strong, but in practice it was not implemented well.
Overall, the fact that private actors are not subject to OIA requests, and that they are not required to disclose information to the public, makes them less transparent than public actors.
There is real danger that if private organisations are not transparent, their misuse of state coercive power might go unchecked -as indeed occurred at Mt Eden prison until the YouTube footage surfaced. This can and does erode legitimacy, as illustrated by Serco losing its contract.
Moreover, a lack of transparency raises a significant issue of timeliness. If Serco had been properly transparent with Corrections, the fight clubs might have been halted more quickly, and the horrendous injuries inflicted on some of the inmates might not have happened.
Mechanisms requiring private actors to be transparent to their public actor principals clearly have the potential to be powerful therefore, but must be properly implemented to be effective in supporting accountability.
Just as strong interim accountability mechanisms are required when private actors lack shared values and goals with their public actor counterparts or the instruments establishing the state coercive powers, so greater emphasis on transparency is needed also. The tendency for a private actor with a profit motive to succumb to moral hazard will be reduced if it must be transparent in its decisions and actions, allowing greater scrutiny of it by an external forum. Such transparency can allow the forum to quickly obtain the information it needs to pass judgement on the actor and swiftly act to curtail transgressions. Thus a lack of shared values creates the need for diligent implementation of transparency requirements, to prevent misuse of state coercive power or at the very least, catch it within a short period of time. To summarise, prosecution is an important state coercive power for effective enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act. It is the ultimate sanction available, and a form of public censure in nature. It can also have consequences for sentencing. Both MPI and the RNZSPCA suffer from inadequate funds being set aside for prosecution, and too few inspectors being available for too many animals. The situation has essentially resulted in non-enforcement of the Act in all but the most extreme cases -something that could affect the legitimacy of the law. The issue does not arise out of whether the responsible actor is public or private, it arises from insufficient funds. This can be easily rectified, particularly if the government commences funding the situation erodes the reputation of the RNZSPCA in the public perception, given the charity's reliance on public donations and the fact that MPI and the police can also prosecute. However, government funding could only strengthen its standing by allowing it to be more effective.
Moreover, the legitimacy of the Act itself is called into question when its enforcement is inconsistent and largely ineffective. This is dangerous territory for any law to be in, therefore this situation should be investigated by policy-makers. One possible solution is to establish a central ministry or independent commissioner (or both), for better enforcement of animal welfare legislation. Services Commission in 2012 rated it as "well placed" or "strong" in effectiveness and efficiency of most aspects of its core business, the sole exception being a rating of "needing development" in its rehabilitation and reintegration services. 167 Overall therefore, the department can be deemed generally effective, albeit needing improvement in some areas. Words, to the delight of lawyers and poets, are shape-shifters, changing their meaning depending on context, popular usage, the mind of the receiver and even tone and inflection.
B The Corrections Act: Effectiveness
Words form the basis of any legal agreement including those of public-private partnerships, yet can never be so tightly pinned down as to make a "watertight" instrument. 
